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1 Facts of the Case
This dispute concerns the imposition of a definitive safeguard measure
by the United States on imports of circular welded carbon quality line
pipe (‘‘line pipe’’) from Korea (WTO DOC. WTO/DS 202/AB/R). The
measure was imposed following an investigation conducted by the US
International Trade Commission (USITC). The USITC determined in a
safeguard investigation initiated on 29 July 1999 that ‘‘circular welded
carbon quality line pipe . . . is being imported into the United States in
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury or
the threat of serious injury.’’1 In its investigation, the USITC identified a
* This study reviews the WTO Appellate Body report United States – Definitive Safeguard
Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe From Korea (WT/
DS202/AB/R 15 February 2002). We are grateful to Henrik Horn and Jasper-Martijn
Wauters for helpful discussions and to Alan Sykes, whose paper (Sykes, 2003) profoundly
influenced our thinking about these issues.
1 The Appellate Body report on United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of
Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe From Korea (WT/DS202/AB/R 15 February
2002; henceforth, Line Pipe) that we discuss in this paper notes (p. 1) that three
Commissioners made a finding of serious injury, two Commissioners made a finding of
threat of serious injury and that the affirmative vote of these five Commissioners
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number of factors apart from increased imports that might have caused
serious injury or threat of serious injury to the domestic line pipe indus-
try. The Commission concluded that increased imports were ‘‘a cause
which is important and not less than any other cause’’ and that, therefore,
the statutory requirement of ‘‘substantial cause’’ had been met.2
By Proclamation of the President of the United States dated 11
February 2000, the United States imposed a definitive safeguard measure
on imports of line pipe in the form of a duty increase for three years
applicable to imports above 9,000 short tons from each source country,
effective 1 March 2000.3 The applicable duty was increased by 19 percent
ad valorem in the first year, 15 percent in the second year, and 11 percent
in the third year. The measure was applied to imports from all countries,
including Members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), but
excluding imports from Canada and Mexico, the NAFTA partners of
the United States.
Korea requested consultations with the United States pursuant to
Article 4 of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the
Settlement of Disputes (DSU), Article XXII:1 of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT) and Article 14 of the Agreement on
Safeguards (SGA), with regard to the safeguard measures on line pipe.4
When the two sides failed to resolve a number of disputed issues, Korea
requested that a WTO panel be established to examine US actions in this
case. The Panel concluded that the US safeguardmeasure for line pipe was
inconsistent with certain of the provisions of the GATT and the SGA.5
The Panel found, inter alia, that the United States had acted inconsistently
with Article 4.2(b) of the SGA by failing to establish a causal link between
the increased imports and serious injury to a domestic industry, or threat
thereof. The Panel however rejected an argument by Korea that the
United States had acted inconsistently with its obligations under
Art. 5.1 of the SGA by imposing a safeguard measure intended to
constituted the majority in support of the ‘‘affirmative determination’’ of the USITC.
A single Commissioner made a negative determination that there was neither serious
injury nor threat of serious injury. The views of that Commissioner are not part of the
USITC determination.
2 See Line Pipe at p. 2.
3 ‘‘Proclamation 7274 of 18 February 2000 – To Facilitate Positive Adjustment to Competition
From Imports of Certain Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe,’’ United States Federal
Register, 23 February 2000 (Volume 65, Number 36), pp. 9193–9196; Panel Report,
para. 7.176, also reflected on p. 3 of the AB report on Line Pipe.
4 WTO Doc. WT/DS202/1, G/L/388, G/SG/D10/1, 15 June 2000.
5 WTO Doc. WT/DS202/5, 22 January 2001.
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counteract the whole of the injury suffered by the import-competing
industry rather than only the part that could be attributed to increased
imports.
Both the United States and Korea appealed aspects of the Panel’s ruling.
The United States claimed inter alia that the Panel was wrong in its ruling
about causality, because the USITC had explicitly addressed that issue and
had found that imports were a substantial cause of serious injury, mean-
ing a ‘‘cause that is important and no less so than any other cause.’’ Korea
argued inter alia that the Panel had erred in sanctioning a safeguard
measure meant to offset the entire injury to the industry and not just
the part due to increased imports. In this chapter, wewill focus on just these
two issues and not on a number of relatively less important questions that
were also in dispute.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
describe the relevant legal provisions in the GATT and the SGA and the
prior WTO jurisprudence that bears on this case. In Section 3, we discuss
the possible objectives of the escape clause in the GATT and the SGA.
Ideally, we would hope to use the objectives of the agreement to inform
our interpretation of the treaty text. However, we will argue that the
parties’ intentions in these agreements are by no means clear. Section 4
outlines in greater detail the issues concerning attribution of injury and
the extent of safeguardmeasures that are at issue in this case. Here, we also
recount the Panel and AB rulings. Section 5 contains our critique of the
AB ruling. We argue that a redrafting of the relevant provisions of the
GATT and the SGA is badly needed. We summarize and conclude in
Section 6.
2 Relevant Legal Provisions and Prior Jurisprudence
2.1 The relevant provisions of GATT and SGA
The WTO treaty allows a signatory to abrogate its obligations to other
Members for a proscribed period of time under certain conditions. The
conditions describe changes in the health of a domestic industry that
competes directly with imports (i.e., that produces a ‘‘like product’’) and
the causes of those changes. In particular, Article XIX.1a of the GATT
states that
If, as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations
incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions,
any product is being imported into the territory of that Member in such
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increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or threaten
serious injury to domestic producers in that territory of like or directly
competitive products, the Member shall be free, in respect of such product,
and to the extent and for such time as may be necessary to prevent or
remedy such injury, to suspend the obligation in whole or in part or to
withdraw or modify the concession.
The SGA provides further detail on the nature of the investigation that
must be used to determine injury, the nature of the required link between
imports and injury, and on many procedural matters.6 Among the provi-
sions that are germane to this case is Article 2.1 of the SGA, which
stipulates that
AMember may apply a safeguard measure to a product only if that Member
has determined, pursuant to the provisions set out below, that such product
is being imported into its territory in such increased quantities, absolute or
relative to domestic production, and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten to cause serious injury to the domestic industry that produces like
or directly competitive products.
Article 4.2a of the SGA adds that
In the investigation to determine whether increased imports have caused or
are threatening to cause serious injury to a domestic industry under the
terms of this Agreement, the competent authorities shall evaluate all
relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having a bearing
on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and amount of the
increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute and relative terms,
the share of the domestic market taken by increased imports, changes in
the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity utilization, profits and
losses, and employment.
Finally, Article 4.2b requires that
The determination referred to in [Article 4.2a] shall not be made unless this
investigation demonstrates, on the basis of objective evidence, the existence
of the causal link between increased imports of the product concerned and
serious injury or threat thereof. When factors other than increased imports are
causing injury to the domestic industry at the same time, such injury shall not
be attributed to increased imports.
(emphasis added)
6 In Argentina – Safeguard Measures On Imports Of Footwear (WTO Doc. WT/DS121/AB/R
of 14 December 1999) and elsewhere the AB has ruled that safeguard measures must be
consistent with both Article 19 of GATT and the SGA; see paras. 83, 84, 93 and 94.
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Concerning the dispute over the nature and extent of the US safeguard
measure, the relevant text is contained in the first sentence of Article 5.1 of
the SGA. This sentence reads that
A Member shall apply safeguard measures only to the extent necessary to
prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment.
2.2 Prior WTO case law
The AB has not as yet attempted to define what the treaty requires as a
standard for ‘‘serious injury,’’ nor has it delineated the factors that should
be considered as possible contributors to that injury. Concerning Article
4.2 of the SGA, where it states that ‘‘the competent authorities shall
evaluate all relevant factors of an objective and quantifiable nature having
a bearing on the situation of that industry, in particular, the rate and
amount of the increase in imports of the product concerned in absolute
and relative terms, the share of the domestic market taken by increased
imports, changes in the level of sales, production, productivity, capacity
utilization, profits and losses, and employment,’’ the AB has ruled in
Argentina – Safeguard Measures on Imports of Footwear (WT/DS121/AB/
R 14 December 1999; henceforth Footwear) that the text requires that the
entire list of factors must be ‘‘evaluated’’ in every case. Also, in United
States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Wheat Gluten From
the European Communities (WT/DS166/AB/R 22 December 2000; hence-
forth Wheat Gluten), the AB has ruled that an investigating authority
faced with multiple potential causes of injury must, in accordance with
Article 4.2a of the SGA, examine every factor known to it and not only
those raised by the interested parties.7
7 Para. 55 of Wheat Gluten states, in part, that:
‘‘. . . in our view, that does not mean that the competent authorities may
limit their evaluation of ‘all relevant factors’, under Article 4.2(a) of the
Agreement on Safeguards, to the factors which the interested parties have
raised as relevant. The competent authorities must, in every case, carry out
a full investigation to enable them to conduct a proper evaluation of all of
the relevant factors expresslymentioned in Article 4.2(a) of the Agreement on
Safeguards. Moreover, Article 4.2(a) requires the competent authorities –
and not the interested parties – to evaluate fully the relevance, if any, of ‘other
factors’.
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Much of the argumentation in disputes concerning the use of safeguard
measures has centered on the meaning of the words ‘‘cause’’ and ‘‘causal’’
in Article XIX.1 of the GATT and Articles 2.1 and 4.2 of the SGA, and on
the meaning of the requirement in Article 4.2b of the SGA that, in
situations where it is deemed that factors other than increased imports
have contributed to an industry’s ill health, ‘‘such injury shall not be
attributed to increased imports.’’ The AB has indicated in United States –
Safeguard Measures On Imports Of Fresh, Chilled Or Frozen Lamb Meat
From New Zealand And Australia (WTO Doc. WT/DS177 and 178/AB/R
of 1 May 2001; henceforth Frozen Lamb) that it considers a two-step
analysis to be appropriate: first, the competent authority must ensure that
injury due to other factors is not attributed to imports and then it must
find evidence of a causal link between increased imports, and injury. The
AB wrote in para.180 of Frozen Lamb:
. . . the ‘causal link’ between increased imports and serious injury can only
be made after the effects of increased imports have been properly assessed,
and this assessment, in turn, follows the separation of the effects caused by
all the different causal factors.
(emphasis in the original)
The AB has not been at all clear about what a competent authority must
do to comply with the requirement that injury due to ‘‘other factors’’
should not be attributed to increased imports. For example, in Wheat
Gluten (para. 70) the AB ruled that
The need to ensure a proper attribution of injury under Article 5.2(b)
indicates that competent authorities must take account, in their determin-
ation, of the effects of increased imports as distinguished from the effects of
other factors.
(emphasis in the original)
while in Frozen Lamb (para. 181) the AB wrote:
We emphasize that the method and approach WTO Members choose to
carry out in the process of separating the effects of the other causal factors is
not specified by theAgreement on Safeguards. What the Agreement requires
is simply that the obligation in Article 4.2 must be respected when a safe-
guard measure is applied.
Nonetheless, the AB has repeatedly found fault with investigations carried
out by the competent authorities, especially the USITC, ruling on several
occasions that they have failed to comply with the requirement for non-
attribution. InWheat Gluten (para. 19), the AB concluded that the USITC
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had not ‘‘adequately evaluated the complexities’’ and had not ‘‘ensured
that injury attributable to other factors is not attributed to imports.’’ In
Frozen Lamb, the AB wrote (para. 185) that
. . .we see nothing in the USITC Report to indicate how the USITC
complied with the obligation found in the second sentence of
Article 4.2(b) and, therefore, we see no basis for either the Panel or us
to assess the adequacy of the USITC process with respect to the ‘‘non-
attribution’’ requirement of Article 4.2(b) of the Agreement on Safeguards.
The USITC Report, on its face, does not explain the process by which the
USITC separated the injurious effects of the different causal factors, nor
does the USITC Report explain how the USITC ensured that the injurious
effects of the other causal factors were not included in the assessment of the
injury ascribed to increased imports.
and (para. 186)
In the absence of any meaningful explanation of the nature and extent of
the injurious effects of these six ‘other’ factors, it is impossible to determine
whether the USITC properly separated the injurious effects of these other
factors from the injurious effects of the increased imports. It is, therefore,
also impossible to determine whether injury caused by these other factors
has been attributed to increased imports.
If an investigating authority somehow could convince the AB that it had
met the requirements for non-attribution, it seems it could rather more
easily meet the standards for establishing causality. In principle, the AB
recognizes the distinction between correlation and causation; for example,
in Footwear (para. 144) it concurred with the Panel that ‘‘coincidence by
itself cannot prove causation.’’ But, in practice, the AB has not grappled
much with the difficulty of demonstrating causal relationships between
economic events. Rather, it has been content to accept co-temporal
movements (i.e., correlation) as evidence of causality in most situations.
In Footwear, the AB noted in para. 141 that ‘‘if causation is present, an
increase in imports normally should coincide with a decline in the
relevant injury factors’’ and in para. 144 it concurred with the Panel that
. . . in an analysis of causation, ‘it is the relationship between the move-
ments in imports (volume and market share) and the movements in injury
factors that must be central to a causation analysis and determination.’
(emphasis added) Furthermore, with respect to a ‘coincidence’ between an
increase in imports and a decline in the relevant injury factors, we note that
the Panel simply said that this should ‘normally’ occur if causation is
present.
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Although the AB has been adamant about the need for an investigating
authority to separate the injury caused by increased imports from those
caused by other factors, it has ruled that the SGA does not require that the
authority show that increased imports alone would have been sufficient to
cause serious injury. To the contrary, the AB stressed in Frozen Lamb
(para. 70) that
. . . the Agreement on Safeguards does not require that increased imports be
‘sufficient’ to cause, or threaten to cause, serious injury. Nor does the
Agreement require the increased imports ‘alone’ be capable of causing, or
threatening to cause, serious injury.
To summarize, the AB has noted the distinction between causation and
correlation, but has not provided guidance on how the two should be
distinguished in practice. The AB has insisted that the Members ensure
that injury caused by other factors not be attributed to increased imports,
but has not suggested an acceptable method for ensuring non-attribution.
And the AB has indicated that an import surge normally should be
contemporaneous with injury to the domestic industry, but has ruled
that the surge need not be sufficient to have caused serious injury without
other, contributing factors.
2.3 Discussion of previous jurisprudence
The AB rulings prior to Line Pipe create a number of difficult problems
for this and subsequent interpretation of the Safeguards Agreement. The
difficulties have been rehearsed at length by Horn and Mavroidis (2003),
Sykes (2003), Irwin (2003), and others, so the discussion here can be
reasonably brief.
First, the AB has failed in all of its rulings to confront the meaning of
the words ‘‘cause’’ and ‘‘causal’’ as they apply in the context of safeguard
proceedings. This is very problematic, because the text makes clear the
need to establish that increased quantities of imports have been a cause of
serious injury to the domestic industry and yet, as Grossman (1986), Kelly
(1988), Rousslang (1988), Horn and Mavroidis (2003), Sykes (2003),
Irwin (2003), and others have argued, the volume of imports of a par-
ticular product into a particular country is an endogenous outcome
that cannot logically be considered to be the cause of other economic
outcomes. That is, a number of supply and demand factors combine to
determine equilibrium outcomes in an industry. Among these are the
factor and input prices faced by national and foreign producers, the
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technologies available for producing the good at home and abroad,
consumers’ tastes for the goods produced by the industry, the prices of
goods produced by competing industries, the overall levels of demand in
the national and international economies, etc. These factors jointly deter-
mine the location of the supply and demand curves for the product of
the import-competing industry and the supply and demand curves for
imports. The supplies and demands in turn determine the sales of the
national industry, the prices of national and imported products, and
(importantly!) the volume of imports. Thus, a change in the underlying
conditions of supply or demand will affect not only the health of the
domestic industry (sales, employment, profits, rates of return on capital,
etc.) but also the quantity of imports. So, it is simply impossible to ascribe
a causal relationship between an increased quantity of imports and injury
to a domestic industry when the two outcome variables are determined
simultaneously by the same set of fundamental variables. Yet, this is
exactly what Article XIX of the GATT and Article 4.1 of the SGA requires
the competent authority in a safeguard investigation to do.
Sykes (2003) has argued that the historical context of the GATT gives
some hints as to what the negotiating parties might have meant by their
wording of the text. At the time that they wrote that ‘‘If, as a result of
unforeseen developments and of the effect of the obligations incurred by a
contracting party under this agreement, including tariff concessions, any
product is being imported into the territory of that contracting party
in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to cause or
threaten serious injury . . .’’ the multilateral tariff reductions that were
being considered by the parties were unprecedented and so their likely
consequences were unknown. It makes sense in this context that the
negotiating parties might have intended to draw a link between the
‘‘effects of the obligations incurred by a contracting party under this
agreement’’ and the ‘‘increased quantities’’ of imports that might ‘‘cause
or threaten serious injury.’’ In other words, it is possible to interpret the
sentence as meaning that the investigating authorities should look not for
a causal relationship between increased imports per se and the conditions
of the domestic industry (which would be impossible), but rather between
the increased imports that resulted from the obligations incurred in the
1947 GATT Agreement and the injury that might result soon thereafter as
a direct consequence thereof.
However, the wording has remained unchanged for fifty-six years and
it is no longer sensible to look for injury caused by obligations incurred
in 1947. Moreover, the AB has ruled explicitly that the requirement that
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injury be a result of ‘‘the obligations incurred by a contracting party under
this agreement, including tariff concessions’’ means only that the import-
ing party must have taken on some obligations as a result of its participa-
tion in the trade treaties.8 As Sykes (2003) concludes, and we agree, the
passage of time and the AB interpretation of the first clause of Article XIX
of the GATT combine to eliminate the possibility of an economically
coherent interpretation of the entire sentence. If it is not increased
imports resulting from some specific exogenous event that is considered
to be a possible cause of injury, but rather increased imports as a whole,
then it is logically impossible to perform the separation of causes stipu-
lated by the non-attribution provisions of the SGA.
It is not surprising, then, that the AB has failed to provide any clear
guidance about what sort of analysis would qualify to meet its require-
ments for non-attribution. While the AB insists that the investigating
authorities must provide a ‘‘reasoned and adequate explanation’’ (Frozen
Lamb at para. 103) for their conclusion that injury due to other factors has
not been attributed to an increase in imports, no such explanation is
possible in the absence of a coherent interpretation of what it means for
imports to cause injury.
2.4 The legal context for Line Pipe: summary
The discussion of causality and non-attribution in the Line Pipe dispute
takes place in the context of a deeply flawed legal environment. Concerning
the text of the pertinent agreements, Sykes (2003, p. 21) summarizes well:
. . . it is important to focus on the fundamental problem: neither Article
XIX nor the Safeguards Agreement offer a coherent foundation for safe-
guard measures. The Appellate Body has consistently emphasized fidelity
to text in its decisions, but that approach simply cannot work when the text
is so fundamentally deficient.
Moreover, the prior case law has done little to resolve the questions raised
by the text and much to add uncertainty about what an investigating
8 Another interpretation with some intellectual appeal would be to read Article XIX of the
GATT as providing an instrument to compensate losses that might result from the most
recent round of trade liberalization. Such an interpretation suffers, however, from at least
two important shortcomings: first, the language to support this interpretation is absent
from the text of the SGA and Article XIX of the GATT; second, such an interpretation
would deprive Members of the right to introduce safeguards when imports surge in
sectors in which tariffs were not reduced in the most recent trade round.
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authority must do to fulfill its obligations to its WTO partners in safe-
guard proceedings. Evidently, such an authority must (i) examine all
relevant factors that may have affected conditions in an industry, includ-
ing those not raised by the interested parties themselves, (ii) establish the
existence of serious injury by examining (at least) all of the industry
factors mentioned in Article 4.2a of the SGA, (iii) provide an explicit,
reasoned and adequate explanation for how it has distinguished the injury
caused by increased imports from the injury caused by other factors, and
(iv) determine that increased imports bear a causal relationship to deteri-
orating industry conditions at least by showing co-movement of these
variables. How it can do so in a world where imports and industry
conditions are simultaneously determined by other exogenous factors
remains unclear.
3 Possible Objectives of the Safeguards Agreement
Before we proceed to our discussion of the issues concerning causality
and non-attribution that arise in Line Pipe, we pause to consider the
objectives of the Safeguards Agreement. As we argued in Grossman and
Mavroidis (2003), it is important to understand the objectives of an
agreement and what behaviors it is meant to discourage or tolerate in
order to interpret the meaning of the text and discern how it ought to be
applied in circumstances that are not explicitly discussed. Unfortunately,
we will find in this case that the objectives of the agreement are no more
clear than is the text or the prior case law. Although there are several
possible economic rationales for including an escape clause in a multi-
lateral trade agreement, the Safeguards Agreement is not structured in a
way that indicates any particular one of them as the intended or proper
purpose. Accordingly, economic theory provides relatively little guidance
as to how the Agreement ought to be interpreted when adjudicating
disputes.
3.1 Safeguards as compensation for losers
The opening of trade via multilateral negotiations will generate aggregate
efficiency gains in many situations, but there are bound to be individuals
and groups that are harmed. The inclusion of safeguard measures in a
trade agreement might be rationalized as a means to compensate the
losers from trade liberalization (see Deardorff, 1987). A safeguard meas-
ure can be used to restore relative prices to what they would have been
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but for the trade liberalization and thereby preserve jobs and incomes for
workers in the import-competing industry. To the extent that the protec-
tion is temporary, the compensation will only be partial. But the burdens
imposed on displaced workers might be mitigated if these workers have a
longer period to retrain and seek new employment.
However, as Burtless et al. (1998), Sykes (2003), and many others have
argued, trade protection is a clumsy tool for effecting redistribution.
Empirical studies have found repeatedly that import-restraining policies
impose very high costs on the importing country per job saved or per
dollar transferred due to the productive inefficiencies that result from
such measures and the great burdens they impose on consumers (see, for
example, Feenstra (1992)). The total cost of these measures is even larger
when the interests of the exporting country are taken into account, as they
presumably will be in any negotiated agreement. Protectionist responses
are poorly targeted policies for the purposes of effecting redistribution to
disadvantaged groups inasmuch as they boost incomes not only of dis-
placed workers and others with specific human capital, but also of well-
diversified (and often quite wealthy) shareholders who own the firms and
capital in the import-competing industry. Also, it is hard to see why a
society would find it desirable to compensate the losses from unexpected
import surges, but not those resulting from other economic events that
affect the fortunes of individuals working in or invested in a particular
industry.
There is nothing explicit in the way that the text of GATTArticle XIX or
the SGA is written to suggest that the intended purpose of the safeguard
provisions is to compensate the losers from trade liberalization. First, the
preferred interpretation of Article XIX of the GATT that has been offered
by the AB does not limit the use of safeguards measures to situations in
which losses are attributable to trade liberalization per se, but rather to
import surges that occur for any reason. Second, Article XXVIII of the
GATT, which provides for renegotiation of concessions, would seem a
preferable tool for protecting the interests of those that are harmed by
trade protection, inasmuch as such renegotiation allows for a more
permanent restoration of competitive conditions to what they were
before the tariff concessions or other effects of an agreement. Third, as
Sykes has argued, the text of Article XIX of the GATT limits application of
safeguards to injury that results from ‘‘unforeseen developments’’; if
redistribution were the rationale for these provisions, it is difficult to
see why the Members would not have wished also to compensate losers
also for the anticipated consequences of their trade concessions.
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3.2 Safeguards to promote restructuring or facilitate adjustment
3.2.1 Promoting investments to restore competitiveness
Industry representatives often seek to justify their pleas for escape clause
protection on the grounds that such measures will provide the where-
withal for reinvestment and restructuring to restore competitiveness.
Temporary protection can increase profitability so that firms have more
funds available to invest in retooling, while the respite from foreign
competition can give them time for their new investments to come on
line. In this way, proponents argue, viable firms can be saved when
otherwise they might be driven from the market by cheap imports.
Although this argument may resonate with some politicians and lay
persons, it makes little economic sense. Firms that are viable in the long
run should be able to finance their investments in restructuring by
borrowing funds or raising equity in the capital markets. For an invest-
ment to be socially warranted, it must yield expected discounted profits
(or other social benefits) at free-market prices that equal or exceed the
cost of the project plus any risk premium. Firms with potential projects
that meet this criterion should be able to borrow at prevailing interest
rates, unless there are imperfections in the capital market. Those that do
not meet the criterion and that become profitable only with the help of
elevated prices during a period of import protection should be rejected as
economically inefficient. And capital markets, at least in the developed
countries, are widely thought to be reasonably efficient, at least in most
cases. Even if they are not, a targeted program that would provide sub-
sidized capital or loan guarantees to firms and industries that are unable
to obtain financing at socially appropriate rates would be a far superior
policy to one of protection, which affects the allocation of all resources
and not just capital, and which imposes avoidable burdens on domestic
consumers.
If Article XIX of the GATT and the Safeguards Agreement were
intended to promote investments in restructuring, one would expect to
find certain provisions in them that are missing. Investments in restruc-
turing ought to be limited to cases in which the domestic industry is viable
in the long run, and in which the private capital markets would charge
an unjustifiable premium to firms attempting to raise external funding.
Thus, a test for the applicability of safeguards would begin with an
examination of whether the conditions in the domestic industry have
changed temporarily or permanently, and whether new investments
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reasonably could be expected to restore profitability. It would also include
an investigation to establish the existence of capital market imperfections
that prevent the domestic industry from financing profitable investments
by borrowing or issuing new shares. It might reasonably include a
requirement that trade policies be used only when less trade distorting
measures (such as credit subsidies or loan guarantees) are unavailable.
Finally, it might include provisions to ensure that the excess profits
generated from the temporary protection are in fact invested in restruc-
turing and not used to generate windfall gains to shareholders and
bondholders. Article XIX of the GATT and the SGA contain none of
these features.
3.2.2 Promoting efficient adjustment
Safeguard measures might also be rationalized as a means to promote
efficient and orderly reallocation of resources (especially labor) in situ-
ations in which adjustment is costly. As Mussa (1982, 1984) has shown, the
mere fact that resource movements are costly provides no presumption
that a free-market adjustment process will be inefficient. If workers have
rational expectations about the future of their industry and have access to
capital markets to finance temporary income shortfalls at interest rates
close to the social discount rate, and if real wages are reasonably flexible
and an individual’s job search creates no externalities for others, then
workers will move from a declining industry to another (and bear the
associated costs of search and re-training) at the rate that is socially
warranted. Of course, labor markets may be distorted due to the existence
of short-run wage rigidities or congestion in the search process. Then, as
Lapan (1976), Neary (1982), Cassing and Ochs (1978) and Davidson and
Matusz (2001) have shown, the free-market rate of adjustment can easily
be too rapid, with excessive unemployment or sub-optimal matching of
workers to jobs.
Horn and Mavroidis (2003) have built a case for including safeguard
provisions in trade agreements around the presence of distortions in the
labor market.9 They describe a situation in which an unanticipated, per-
manent shift in the foreign supply curve of imports indicates a decline in
the efficient, long-run employment level in a domestic industry. Following
such a shock, a temporary safeguard measure could be expected to raise
social welfare if the size of total adjustment costs depends positively on the
speed of adjustment, and if there is a gap between the private and social
9 See also Sykes (1991) and, for a more formal treatment, Davidson and Matusz (2002).
112 gene m. grossman and petros c. mavroidis
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1474745605001266
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 19:36:21, subject to the Cambridge Core
costs of adjustment. The positive link between the speed of adjustment
and the size of adjustment costs would arise, for example, if wages are
inflexible, so that a fall in labor demand results in displacements rather
than wage cuts, and if the number of workers that can be absorbed by
new employers rises gradually over time. In such circumstances, with
unemployment caused by wage rigidities rather than optimal search for
new employment, the private and social costs of unemployment are
bound to diverge.
Horn and Mavroidis (2003) note some potential pitfalls in the use of
safeguard measures to promote more efficient adjustment, which might
account for some of the features of Article XIX of the GATT and the SGA.
First, governments might be tempted to invoke safeguard protection any
time they feel political pressure from special interests in an industry, and
not just in response to shocks that necessitate fine-tuning of the adjust-
ment process. A test for serious injury might be incorporated into the
safeguard provisions as a means to discourage such opportunistic behav-
ior. Also, if safeguard measures could be invoked to cushion any negative
shocks, firms in the domestic industry might face insufficient incentives
to exercise due diligence in avoiding unnecessary job displacements.
To eliminate this moral hazard for the domestic industry, the escape
clause provisions could require a causal link between external events
and injury to the industry, and preclude the use of safeguard measures
when the need for adjustment is entirely due to the poor performance of
domestic firms.
While the adjustment-cost rationale for safeguard provisions is con-
sistent with certain features of the WTO Safeguards Agreement, it is hard
to interpret the Agreement as a whole as being a response to this particular
economic problem. First, as Horn andMavroidis (2003) themselves point
out, a protectionist measure is hardly a first-best response to the labor
market imperfection that they (and others) have identified. It would be
far more efficient to treat adjustment problems with a program of
‘‘adjustment assistance’’ that would provide income insurance for dis-
placed workers plus worker training and perhaps some wage subsidies. In
fact, empirical studies by Hufbauer and Elliot (1994), Sazanami et al.
(1995), Messerlin (2001), among many others, suggest that, in practice,
the costs of trade protection in a variety of countries far outweigh the
possible efficiency gains attainable from slowing the rate of worker reloca-
tion. Second, as Sykes (2003) points out, a safeguard provision intended
to promote more efficient adjustment would include an investigation of
industry conditions to determine whether they suggest that it would be
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beneficial to stretch out the adjustment process. At the least, a high rate of
industry unemployment might seem a sensible pre-requisite for safeguard
measures intended to slow the departure of workers from an industry.
But the SGA explicitly requires that competent authorities examine a
variety of indicators of industry health and not just unemployment.
Third, the SGA has no provisions to ensure that adjustment actually
takes place during the period of temporary protection. Indeed, many
industries have used safeguard protection as a way to avoid contraction,
and many have returned for second and third doses of ‘‘temporary’’ relief
after having failed to adjust.
3.3 Safeguards as political safety valves
A third possible objective of the safeguard provision in trade agreements
is to serve as a political safety valve. If a Member knows that it can
‘‘escape’’ from its commitments in the face of intense political pressures,
it may be willing to make greater concessions in its multilateral negoti-
ations than would be the case if its liberalization was irreversible.
Moreover, if an agreement gives a Member the option to roll back prior
concessions in times of political need, this may dissuade the Member
from resorting to extra-legal measures or from scrapping the agreement
altogether. This rationale for safeguard provisions has been developed
most fully by Sykes (1991, 2003), who goes on to argue that ‘‘serious
injury’’ might be a proxy for intense political pressure in the importing
country, while increased quantities of imports suggest that the foreign
industry is not suffering similarly. Sykes suggests that when an import
surge coincides with serious injury to an industry in an importing coun-
try, safeguard measures might be used to create surplus for the two
governments, inasmuch as the government in the importing country
could gain more political support from a market-closing measure than
the other would lose.
To some extent, it is tautological to argue that safeguard provisions
have been included in trade agreements to provide a political safety valve.
The provisions would not be part of the agreement had the negotiators
not perceived that allowing them to be invoked in certain circumstances
would create political surplus for the Member governments. The issue of
concern is whether taking this perspective provides guidance on how the
treaty text ought to be interpreted. Surely, Members cannot be allowed to
escape from the agreement any time they claim a political benefit from
doing so, for this would invite opportunistic behavior and would in no
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way ensure that the provisions are invoked only when the political gains
to the government of the importing country exceed the losses to those of
the exporting country. And whereas Sykes (2003) argues that ‘‘serious
injury’’ and correlation of injury with increased imports suffices to iden-
tify the relevant circumstances, we question whether this is so. Grossman
and Helpman (1994) show, for example, that access to a foreign market
may be especially valuable to special interests in an exporting industry
when those firms are highly productive and enjoy low costs. In such
circumstances, a safeguard measure might impose greater political costs
on the government of the exporting country than it provides benefits to
that of the importing country.10
In short, it is not enough to recognize that the safeguard provisions are
intended as a political safety valve to be invoked whenever the continued
application of bound tariffs would cause more political harm to the
government of the importing country than would their temporary sus-
pension cause to the government of the exporting country, for this would
amount to a legal test with little if any normative guidance, and hence
would be unsuitable in the context of international adjudication. We, as
interpreters of the agreement, still need to know how the negotiating
parties meant to identify such circumstances and what limitations they
intended to impose on the importing country to protect the political
interests of the government of the exporting country. In reviewing this
and other potential objectives of the safeguard provisions, we find little to
guide us in interpreting the language of the text or in adjudicating
disputes such as Line Pipe. The SGA is silent about what the Members
intended to achieve by their incorporation of safeguard provisions in the
trade treaty.
We are thus faced with a situation in which an agreement that is opaque
about its intended objectives contains an incoherent conditions test.
Under the circumstances, it is almost impossible for us to render a cogent
interpretation of the text that could be used to determine when safeguard
measures are permissible and when they are not. But this question is the
essence of the Line Pipe dispute, to which we now turn.
10 Sykes argues that when exporters are especially profitable, the special interests in the
exporting industry will not value market access highly, because any potential rents will
be dissipated by entry; see also Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2001). But this argument
rests on the assumption that there are no quasi-fixed factors of production in the
industry that might limit entry and thereby create rents for those who have entered first.
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4 Issues and Rulings in Line Pipe
4.1 USITC investigation and findings
The safeguard provisions in US trade law are contained in Sections 201 to
204 of the Trade Act of 1974. These Sections allow interested parties in an
import-competing industry to petition the USITC requesting an investi-
gation as to whether a product is being imported into the United States in
such increased quantities as to be a substantial cause of serious injury, or
threat thereof, to the domestic industry producing an article that is like or
directly competitive with the imported article. The statute defines a
‘‘substantial cause’’ to be a ‘‘cause which is important and not less than
any other cause.’’ It defines ‘‘serious injury’’ as a ‘‘significant overall
impairment in the position of a domestic industry.’’ Sections 201 to 204
do not require that injury be linked to any trade liberalization or conces-
sions made by the United States in an international agreement, nor do
they stipulate any explicit effort on the part of the USITC to ensure that
injury caused by other factors is not attributed to increased imports.
The USITC instituted a Section 201 investigation of line pipe on
30 June 1999 following receipt of a petition from seven domestic produ-
cers and the United Steelworkers of America. As required by US law, the
Commissioners considered whether the domestic industry producing line
pipe had suffered serious injury or threat thereof, and if so, whether
increased imports were a substantial cause of that injury. In their report
of December 1999, the Commission reported its findings that there were
increased quantities of imports during the five years preceding the inves-
tigation, that the domestic industry had suffered serious injury, and that
imports were a substantial cause of that injury.11 In making its determin-
ation of serious injury, the Commission considered a variety of indica-
tors of industry conditions, including all of those listed in Article 4.2a of
the SGA. As possible causes of injury, the Commission considered the role
of increased imports, of decline in the demand for line pipe due to
reduced oil and natural gas drilling, of competition among domestic
producers, of changes in the market for oil country tubular goods (also
produced by domestic producers of line pipe) that may have caused
domestic line pipe producers to switch production out of these goods,
11 Three commissioners found that the industry had suffered serious injury, two found that
the industry was threatened by serious injury, and one found that there had been no
injury. According to USITC rules, this constitutes a finding in favor of serious injury.
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of contraction in US producers’ export markets, of increase in per-unit
overhead resulting from shrinking production, and of declines in raw
material costs. The Commission ruled that the decline in demand for line
pipe resulting from reduced oil and natural gas drilling and production
activities indeed had contributed to the industry’s poor performance, but
that the effects of increased imports on the domestic industry were as
great or greater. It also ruled that the other factors either had no adverse
effect on the industry, or had an effect that was very much smaller than
that of imports. Finally, concerning the attribution of injury to its various
causes, the Commissioners wrote:12
Respondents also argued that we may not attribute injury caused by [the
other] factors to the imports. We have not done so. As required by the
statute, after evaluating all possible causes of injury, we have determined
that the imports are an important cause of serious injury and are not less
important than any other cause.
In the light of its positive finding that increased imports were a substantial
cause of serious injury to the domestic line pipe industry, the USITC
recommended various remedies to the President of the United States. The
President introduced a safeguard measure by proclamation, without
providing an explicit justification for the extent of the measure or any
evidence that the measure was limited to that which was necessary to
address the injury that could be attributed to increased imports.
4.2 The Panel ruling
AWTO Panel was established on 23 October 2000 to consider complaints
by Korea regarding the line pipe measure. Korea argued before the Panel
inter alia that the USITC had violated its obligations under Article 4.2b of
the SGA by failing to demonstrate properly that injury caused by other
factors had not been attributed to increased imports. In particular, Korea
asserted that the USITC had not properly distinguished the injurious
effects caused by other factors from those caused by imports and thus it
could not assure the non-attribution required by Article 4.2b of the SGA.
Korea also claimed that the United States had violated its obligations
contained in Article 5.1 of the SGA to ensure that its safeguard measure
was applied ‘‘only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy serious
12 See the USITC investigation of Circular Welded Carbon Quality Line Pipe (USITC
Investigation No. TA-201-70, Publication 3261, December 1999) at p. I–30.
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injury and to facilitate adjustment.’’ Korea contended that a safeguard
measure must be limited in size to at most what would counteract the
injurious effects of the increased imports. According to Korea, because
the USITC had not ensured that injury caused by other factors was not
attributed to increased imports, it could also not ensure that the safeguard
measures introduced subsequently were applied only to the extent neces-
sary to offset the injury attributable to imports.
The Panel ruled in favor of Korea on the first point, rejecting in the
process the US argument that the USITC had properly distinguished the
effects of other factors from the effects of increased imports by examining
six factors other than increased imports as possible causes of serious
injury and determining that none was a more important cause of injury.
The Panel concluded on this point that the USITC ‘‘did not adequately
explain how it ensured that injury caused to the domestic industry by
factors other than increased imports was not attributed to increased
imports.’’13
The Panel rejected Korea’s claims about the permissible extent of the
safeguard measure, ruling that it had failed to make a prima facie case
showing that the United States had violated Article 5.1 of the SGA. The
Panel noted (para. 7.11) that ‘‘Korea has failed to identify any aspect of
the line pipe measure which would suggest that it was intended to address
the injurious effects of the decline in the oil and gas industry’’ and added
that even had the remedy recommended by the USITC been intended to
do so, this did not mean that the line pipe measure that was eventually
applied by the United States was illegal, because the latter differed sub-
stantially from the remedy recommended by the Commission. The panel
concluded that ‘‘[s]ince Korea has failed to establish any factual basis for
its argument, it is not necessary for us to consider the substantive issue of
whether or not safeguard measures should be confined to addressing the
injurious effects of imports.’’ Evidently, the Panel did not find merit in
Korea’s claim that the failure by the USITC to distinguish the injury due
to other factors from that due to increased imports implies, as a matter of
logic, that the United States could not have succeeded in limiting the
extent of the safeguard measure so as to counteract only the injurious
effects of the increased imports.
13 See United States – Definitive Safeguard Measures on Imports of Circular Welded Carbon
Quality Line Pipe From Korea (WT/DS202/R 29 October 2001) at para. 7.290.
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4.3 Appellant arguments and the AB ruling
The United States appealed the Panel’s ruling on non-attribution, arguing
that the Panel had simply presumed without any factual analysis that the
USITC had not complied with Article 4.2b of the SGA in this case. This
presumption, the United States claimed, was based on amisinterpretation
by the Panel of the AB rulings in Frozen Lamb and Wheat Gluten. The
United States contended that the USITC had in fact identified and dis-
tinguished the effects of other factors and did not attribute injury caused
by those factors to imports, but that the Panel failed to acknowledge or
review those findings and analysis. In the view of the United States, the
Panel had simply assumed that the USITC’s relative injury causation
analysis could not possibly have entailed separation and assessment of
the injurious effects of factors other than imports, because the methods
used in the case were similar to those found faulty in previous cases.
Korea appealed the Panel’s ruling on the proportionality of the line pipe
measure on the basis that the Panel had failed to recognize a link in the
SGA between the causation analysis that a competent authority must
perform in order to justify the use of a safeguard measure and the
permissible extent of that measure. According to Korea, the SGA limits
the extent of a safeguard measure to that which would offset the serious
injury attributable to increased imports. If the USITC had failed to ensure
that injury due to other factors was not attributed to increased imports, it
must have also failed to ensure that the safeguardmeasure was applied only
to the extent of the injury that could be attributed to the increased imports.
The AB upheld the ruling of the Panel on the issue of non-attribution.
Essentially, the AB found that the US analysis of causation did not provide
a reasoned and adequate explanation of how it had ensured that injury
caused by other factors had not been attributed to increased imports.
First, the AB reiterated its understanding of the requirements imposed by
Article 4.2b of the SGA:
We have previously ruled, and we reaffirm now, that, to fulfill this require-
ment, competent authorities must separate and distinguish the injurious
effect of the increased imports form the injurious effects of the other factors.
As we ruled in US – Hot-Rolled Steel with respect to the similar requirement
in Article 3.5 of theAnti-Dumping Agreement, so, too, we are of the view that,
with respect to Article 4.2(b), last sentence, competent authorities are
required to identify the nature and extent of the injurious effects of the
known factors other than increased imports, as well as explain satisfactorily
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the nature and extent of the injurious effects of those other factors as
distinguished from the injurious effects of the increased imports.
(para. 215)
Accordingly, the AB noted,
. . . competent authorities must establish explicitly, through a reasoned and
adequate explanation, that injury caused by factors other than increased
imports is not attributed to increased imports. This explanation must be
clear and unambiguous. It must not merely imply or suggest an explana-
tion. It must be a straightforward explanation in express terms.
(para. 217)
The AB accepted Korea’s argument that, although the USITC had recog-
nized that a decline in oil and gas drilling and production had caused
injury to the domestic line pipe industry, it had not explicitly identified
the nature and extent of the injury attributable to this cause and so it
could not have properly separated and distinguished these effects from
the effects of increased imports. The AB concluded that
Our examination [of the US appellant’s submissions and of the cited parts
of the USITC report] leads us to conclude that those cited parts of the
USITC report do not establish explicitly, with a reasoned and adequate
explanation, that injury caused by factors other than the increased imports
was not attributed to increased imports. The passage on page I–30 of the
USITC report highlighted by the United States is but a mere assertion that
injury caused by other factors is not attributed to increased imports.
A mere assertion such as this does not establish explicitly, with a reasoned
and adequate explanation, that injury caused by factors other than the
increased imports was not attributed to increased imports. This brief
assertion in the USITC Report offers no reasoning and no explanation at
all, and therefore falls short of what we have earlier described as a reasoned
and adequate explanation.
(para. 220, emphasis in the original)
Apparently, the AB ruling compels the competent authorities to provide a
full accounting of the causes of all injury suffered by an industry to
establish explicitly that the injury attributed to imports does not include
parts due to other causes.
The AB also ruled in favor of Korea on the issue it raised concerning the
permissible extent of the safeguardmeasure. The AB first emphasized that
the treaty allows only limited safeguard measures, namely those that are
‘‘necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and facilitate adjustment.’’
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Since the measures are limited to what is necessary to achieve a certain
objective, it becomes imperative to identify the objective. The answer
clearly is to offset serious injury, but which serious injury? The AB
answers its own question, when it opines that
[i]n our view, the ‘serious injury’ to which Article 5.1, first sentence, refers
is, in any particular case, necessarily the same ‘serious injury’ that has been
determined to exist by competent authorities of a WTO member pursuant
to Article 4.2. We think it reasonable to assume that, as the Agreement
provides only one definition of ‘serious injury’, and as the Agreement does
not distinguish the ‘serious injury’ to which Article 5.1 refers from the
‘serious injury’ to which Article 4.2 refers, the ‘serious injury’ in Article 5.1
and the ‘serious injury’ in Article 4.2 must be considered as one and the
same. On this, we agree with the United States. But, contrary to what the
United States argues, the fact that these two provisions refer to the same
‘serious injury’ does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that a safeguard
measure may address the ‘entirety’ of the ‘serious injury,’ including the part
of the ‘serious injury’ that is attributable to factors other than increased
imports.
(para. 249)
Next, the AB notes that the meaning of ‘‘serious injury’’ here must
be understood in the context of the agreement. The AB sees the non-
attribution language in Article 4.2b of the SGA as a central part of the
architecture of the SGA and thus as providing the appropriate context for
interpreting Article 5.1 of the SGA. The AB argues that
. . . the non-attribution language of the second sentence of Article 4.2b has
two objectives. First, it seeks, in situations where several factors cause injury
at the same time, to prevent investigating authorities from inferring the
required ‘causal link’ between imports and serious injury or threat thereof
on the basis of the injurious effects caused by factors other than increased
imports. Second, it is a benchmark for ensuring that only an appropriate
share of the overall injury is attributed to increased imports. As we read the
Agreement, this latter objective, in turn, informs the permissible extent to
which the safeguard measure may be applied pursuant to Article 5.1, first
sentence. Indeed, as we see it, this is the only possible interpretation of the
obligation set out in Article 4.2b, last sentence, that ensures its consistency
with Article 5.1, first sentence. . . .
(para. 252)
From this, the AB concluded that ‘‘. . . the phrase ‘only to the extent
necessary to prevent or remedy serious injury and to facilitate adjustment’
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in Article 5.1 of the SGA, first sentence, must be read as requiring that
safeguard measures may be applied only to the extent that they address
serious injury attributed to increased imports’’ (see para. 261 on p. 83).
5 Critique of the AB Rulings
5.1 Attributing the causes of injury
The GATT and the SGA – especially when taken in combination with the
prior rulings on escape clause cases by the WTO Appellate Body – do not
provide a coherent framework for determining the legality of a safeguard
measure. The text requires that the competent authorities find imports to
be a cause of serious injury to a domestic industry and that, in so doing,
they do not attribute to imports the ill effects of other factors that may be
contributing to the industry’s poor health. Yet simple economic reason-
ing reveals that an increased quantity of imports cannot per se be a ‘‘cause’’
of injury, inasmuch as the quantity of imports is determined as an
equilibrium outcome along with the various indicators of industry health.
For an economic variable to be the ‘‘cause’’ of some effect, it must be
possible for that variable tomove exogenously and independently of other
possible causes. But imports are endogenous, responding as they do to
conditions of supply and demand in the domestic and foreign markets.14
In principle, it might be possible to ascertain the Members’ intended
meaning in Article XIX.1 of the GATT and Article 4 of the SGA by
considering their objectives in structuring these agreements. But, as we
have argued in Section 3 above, the objectives themselves are not clear.
The intended role of the safeguard provisions might be to ensure com-
pensation of losers from trade liberalization, to promote efficient read-
justment in the face of industry shocks, or to provide a ‘‘safety valve’’ to
relieve political pressures. One can readily construct an economic ration-
ale for safeguard provisions that would serve any one of these objectives,
but a sensible treaty aiming to achieve each such objective would have to
include additional features that are absent from the SGA. Moreover, one
would not structure an agreement aimed largely at compensation, for
example, in the same way as one intended to promote efficient adjust-
ment. Thus, without knowledge of the primary purpose and intended
function of the agreement, one cannot be sure how to structure an
14 For an elementary exposition of this point, see Kelly (1988) or Horn and Mavroidis
(2003).
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appropriate causality test (if, in fact, the inclusion of such a test is
indicated at all).
Let us return to the case at hand. In the absence of a clear text and in the
light of the jurisprudential history that has involved repeated findings of
illegality, it would have behooved the AB to provide guidance about what
sort of investigation would satisfy the requirements of the SGA as cur-
rently written. Admittedly, such guidance would only serve as a palliative
until the text of the agreement can be improved; but without it, the
competent authorities are faced with a text apparently demanding an
attribution exercise that cannot meaningfully be performed.
One possible way to lend coherence to Article XIX.1 of GATT and
Article 4.1 of the SGA is suggested in a paper by Grossman (1986). In that
paper, Grossman confronted the question of how one should interpret the
requirement in Section 201 of the US Trade Act of 1974 that safeguard
measures be reserved for situations in which increased imports are shown
to be a substantial cause of injury to the domestic industry. Since the
quantity of imports per se cannot meaningfully be considered to be an
exogenous event, Grossman proposed that the USITC seek to identify an
event that is ‘‘trade-related’’ and truly exogenous with respect to the
health of the domestic industry. A change in trade policy (e.g., a tariff
concession) might constitute such an event, but such an interpretation of
injury caused by imports would be too narrow in the context of US trade
law, because Section 201 makes no reference whatsoever to trade policy
when describing the circumstances that would justify a safeguard meas-
ure. As an alternative, Grossman noted that a shift in the supply curve of
imports is exogenous to the health of the domestic industry and that such
a shift could legitimately be considered as a potential cause of injury.15
The import supply curve shifts whenever the United States lowers a trade
barrier, but also when foreign producers acquire a new technology,
become more efficient, experience a fall in factor prices, or install new
capacity. Thus, a shift in the import supply curve is distinguished from an
increase in the quantity of imports inasmuch as the former reflects events
that occur outside the US industry and thus is independent of the ‘‘other
factors’’ that impinge upon the industry’s health, whereas the latter is the
result of events that occur inside the industry as well as those that take
place abroad.16
15 See also Kelly (1988), who adopts a similar approach.
16 Put differently, it is possible to separate the effects of a shift in the import supply curve
from the effects of other factors that impact the health of an import-competing industry,
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The ‘‘import supply curve’’ approach lends economic coherence to
Section 201 by asking whether changing conditions of import supply,
rather than increased quantities of imports, have been a substantial cause
of injury to the US industry.17 Since a ‘‘substantial cause’’ in the US trade
is defined to be a cause that is ‘‘important and not less so than any other
cause,’’ Grossman proceeds in his paper to enumerate a list of potential
exogenous variables that might have caused injury to the US steel industry
during the period that he considered, and develops a methodology to
compare the amount of injury attributable to each one.
Article XIX.1 of the GATT does not require the competent authorities
to show that increased imports have been a substantial cause of injury to a
domestic industry. Rather, it requires the authorities to assess whether
‘‘. . . as a result of unforeseen developments and of the effect of the
obligations incurred by a Member under this Agreement, including tariff
concessions, any product is being imported into the territory of that
Member in such increased quantities and under such conditions as to
cause or threaten serious injury to domestic producers.’’ It is possible to
interpret the exogenous event here as being ‘‘the obligations incurred by a
Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions.’’ Indeed,
Sykes (2003) suggests that this may have been the meaning intended by
the negotiators of the original agreement, wherein ‘‘the obligations
as is required to ensure non-attribution. But it is not possible to separate the effects of an
increase in the quantity of imports from the effects of these other factors, because the
other factors will alter the quantity of imports even as they cause injury to the domestic
industry.
17 Sykes (2003) recognizes this virtue of the import supply curve approach, but criticizes it
for ‘‘effectively rewriting the statute’’ without providing a legal theory to support its
interpretation of the text. We would respond that the incoherence of the text makes
some rewriting by the interpreter unavoidable. Absent some imaginative interpretation,
the WTO judge would, in the face of the incoherence of the causality-requirement as
currently reflected in the SGA, effectively have to deprive WTO Members of the
possibility to use safeguards until a new re-negotiated SGA is put in place of the existing
text. This would be the case if the WTO judge were to conclude, having exhausted the
interpretative elements of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, that the current test is unreasonable or absurd. The other possibility would be
for the judge to pick one of the three possible rationales for a safeguards clause that we
have advanced supra and define the permissible extent of safeguards by using such a
benchmark. Our preferred interpretation can be defended over such an approach with
reference to the moral hazard that would exist if domestic factors were to play a role in
determining the legitimacy of safeguards. For more on this point, see Horn and
Mavroidis (2003). Eventually of course, a clear rewriting of the SGA in this respect has
the advantage of providing upfront clarity as to what was actually intended by the
Member countries.
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incurred’’ referred to the entirety of the commitments made under the
new treaty. Since the treaty remains in force fifty-six years later, it is no
longer possible to associate the ‘‘obligations incurred’’ with the original
concessions made in 1947. But the ‘‘obligations incurred’’ might now be
read to mean any (or perhaps the most recent) concessions made by a
Member of the WTO as a part of the multilateral negotiating process.
These policy changes are exogenous events as far as the industry is
concerned, and they might give rise to unforeseen developments, includ-
ing an increase in imports that causes injury.
It would also be possible to take a broader view, such as the one
proscribed by the AB. The AB prefers to read the second part of the first
sentence of Article XIX.1 of the GATT (i.e., ‘‘the obligations incurred by a
Member under this Agreement, including tariff concessions’’) as providing
only the context in which the injury takes place. With this reading, it is not
possible to use a change in trade policy as the exogenous event that might
precipitate injury. But then the import supply curve approach could be
used to provide a coherent interpretation of the remainder of the sentence.
In other words, the statute might be read to require an assessment of
whether unforeseen shifts of the import supply curve that have induced
growth in the volume of imports, were also responsible for having seri-
ous injury or threat thereof to a domestic industry. The US statute and
Article 4.2 of the SGA can then be seen as mandating a ‘‘but for’’ analysis by
the competent authorities, who would need to compare the actual health
of the domestic industry with that which would have prevailed but for
the change in the conditions of import supply (with all else the same).
A safeguard measure would be permitted if and only if the difference
between the actual and hypothetical state of the industry was found to be
sufficiently great to meet the standard for ‘‘serious injury’’ or threat thereof.
Note that the approach of considering shifts in the import supply curve
as the exogenous events that might precipitate injury is distinct from the
methods that might be used to carry out the but-for analysis indicated by
such an approach. Grossman (1986) has illustrated one possible approach
to the counterfactual analysis. He posits a model of the US steel industry in
which indicators of industry health are determined by demand trends in the
US demand for steel, the aggregate level of industrial production, the world
price of iron ore, the world price of energy, and the world price of imported
steel. The last of these variables is taken to reflect the location of the import
supply curve under the assumption that the United States consumes a
relatively small share of the world output of steel. Grossman establishes
econometrically a statistical relationship between the indicators of industry
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conditions and current and lagged values of the exogenous variables. He
then performs counterfactual simulations to assess how changes in each
exogenous variable had contributed to deteriorating conditions in the
industry, given the time paths of the others. Grossman was able to evaluate
the claim that increased imports of steel (due to changes in import supply
conditions) were a substantial cause of injury to the US steel industry by
comparing the magnitude of the injury attributable to each factor.
Although not conceived for this purpose, his results could also be used to
evaluate claims that increased imports resulting from exogenous changes in
import supply had caused serious injury to the US industry. Note that the
econometric methodology ensures that injury due to other factors besides
imports is not attributed to imports; it does so by examining the partial
effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable while holding
constant the effect of all others.
The econometric methodology proposed by Grossman (1986) is not
the only one that might be used to implement the import supply curve
approach. Kelly (1988) proposes an alternative method based on the
empirical calibration of a simple model of supply and demand for
imports and imperfectly-substitutable domestic products. The important
point is that the competent authorities should adopt some method that
yields a ‘‘reasoned and adequate explanation’’ of the partial effect of
changed conditions of import supply on industry health, holding con-
stant the values of other exogenous variables that might also have affected
conditions in the domestic industry.
We return now to Line Pipe. Clearly, the AB did not provide the sort of
guidance and interpretation of the statutes that we feel would have been
appropriate. Did they also err in finding that the United States had acted
inconsistently with its obligation under Article 4.2b of the SGA by failing
to ensure that injury caused to the domestic industry by factors other than
increased imports was not attributed to increased imports? We think not.
We have offered two possible interpretations of Article XIX.1 of the
GATT, one that treats the exogenous event that might cause injury to a
domestic industry as a change in trade policy resulting from obligations
incurred under a multilateral agreement and another that treats the
exogenous event as a shift in the import supply curve that occurs for
any reason. Under either interpretation, Article 4.2b of the SGA still
demands objective evidence of a causal relationship that does not attrib-
ute to increased imports any injury that may have been caused by other
factors. Our reading of the USITC report has been hindered by the
censoring done to preserve confidentiality. Still, we find no evidence
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that the USITC carried out the sort of but-for analysis that we would
deem necessary for the purpose. For example, nowhere in the document
do we find an estimate of the injury caused by any exogenous event related
to trade, holding constant the paths of other variables such as the level of
oil and gas drilling or the demand for oil country tubular goods. Without
such analysis, the USITC could not have ensured that injury caused by
these other factors was not attributed to increased imports, the assertions
on page I–30 of the report notwithstanding.
5.2 The allowable extent of a safeguard measure
On the question of the permissible extent of a safeguard measure, the AB
ruled that thewords ‘‘only to the extent necessary to prevent or remedy seri-
ous injury and to facilitate adjustment’’ in the first sentence of Article 5.1
of the SGA should be read as limiting the extent of a safeguard measure
so that it addresses only the serious injury suffered by the industry that can
be attributed to increased imports. To reach this conclusion, the AB
reflected on whether the ‘‘serious injury’’ referred to in Article 4.2 of the
SGA is necessarily the same ‘‘serious injury’’ mentioned in Article 5.1 of the
SGA. The AB noted that the Agreement provides only one definition of
‘‘serious injury’’ and does not draw any distinctions in the two references to
this term. It inferred from this that the two mentions of ‘‘serious injury’’
must refer to the same underlying concept. The AB reasoned that, inas-
much as the non-attribution clausemodifies the serious injury described in
Article 4.2 of the SGA, the samemodificationmust apply to the usage of the
term in Article 5.1 of the SGA. The AB concluded that
[i]t would be illogical to require an investigating authority to ensure that
the ‘causal link’ between increased imports and serious injury not be based
on the share of injury attributed to factors other than increased imports
while, at the same time, permitting a Member to apply a safeguard measure
addressing injury caused by all factors.
(para. 252)
We do not agree that such a requirement would somehow be ‘‘illogical.’’ As
we noted in Section 3, the obligation that injury be linked to external events
might reasonably be included as a pre-requisite for safeguard measures in
order to address the moral-hazard problem that otherwise would exist if
firms could generate protection by their own actions. Once a Member can
demonstrate, however, that the poor health of its industry is not (entirely)
of its own doing, it might be desirable to allow that Member to counteract
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the full extent of the injury suffered by the industry from all sources. In other
words, the reason for insisting on a causal link between increased imports
and serious injury can be quite different from the considerations that
determine the optimal extent of the consequent remedy.
While we cannot exclude the possibility that the Members intended to
allow safeguard measures to offset the full extent of injury by applying
logic to the wording of the first sentence of Article 5.1 of the SGA, neither
do we see an obvious textual argument to conclude otherwise. If anything,
the wording of Article XIX.1a of the GATT would seem to support the
interpretation offered by the AB of Article 5.1 of the SGA. In particular,
Article XIX.1a of the GATT allows safeguard measures when a product is
being imported ‘‘in such increased quantities and such conditions as to
cause or threaten serious injury,’’ but only ‘‘to the extent and for such time
as may be necessary to prevent or remedy such injury . . .’’ (emphasis
added). The use of the word ‘‘such’’ in the latter clause would seem to
refer the interpreter back to the injury attributable to increased imports.
As a matter of economics, there is little we can say about rules regarding
the size of safeguard measures without knowing more about the object-
ives of the Agreement. For example, if the purpose of the SGA is to
compensate the losers from trade liberalization, then the applicable safe-
guard measure should be limited in size to whatever would restore
competitive conditions to what they would be but for the relevant changes
in trade policy. But if the purpose of the Agreement instead is to encour-
age restructuring of the domestic industry or to facilitate efficient adjust-
ment, arguably it is the entirety of the injury suffered by the domestic
industry that should be used as the basis for tailoring a temporary
palliative. An industry that has suffered some injury due to foreign
competition and more injury due to other causes will face greater needs
for reinvestment and/or adjustment than one that has only suffered from
trade competition. If the argument can be made that temporary protec-
tion contributes to a more efficient adjustment process, the indicated
safeguard measure in the former case may be larger than in the latter. In
short, we cannot judge the appropriate size of a safeguard measure from
an economic standpoint without knowing what distributive or efficiency-
enhancing purpose the measure is intended to serve.
6 Conclusions
To conclude, we have argued that the text of the SGA suffers from two
serious deficiencies: Article 4.2b of the SGA calls for a causality test that
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is economically incoherent and therefore not operational; and the
agreement fails to express explicit objectives of the safeguard provisions.
With an incoherent text and an absence of clear objectives, it is impossible
for the adjudicator to determine when the conditions for a safeguard
measure have been satisfied and what is the permissible extent of such a
measure.
In the Line Pipe dispute, Korea claimed that the United States had not
properly attributed injury to its various causes and that its safeguard
measures exceeded in scope what is permitted under the treaty. The
AB ruled against the United States essentially on procedural grounds. It
is difficult for us to disagree with the AB ruling in view of the causal
analysis contained in the USITC investigatory report. However, where the
AB embraced the non-attribution requirement in Article 4.2b of the SGA,
it lent operational significance to an incoherent requirement. To our
mind, the AB ruling in this respect is flawed. The AB could instead have
ruled that after exhausting the interpretative elements proscribed by
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it
had reached the conclusion that the legal text lacks an internally consist-
ent interpretation.
Such a ruling would have left the AB with a dilemma: either it must
refrain from ruling in the particular dispute and instead demand of the
WTO members that they address, through legislative action, the short-
comings of the text (namely, that imports cannot be a cause of injury
inasmuch as they are endogenously determined along with the health of
the domestic injury, and so the causality test for a safeguard measure
logically can never be met); or it must interpret the text imaginatively so
as to render it internally consistent and operational. The first of these
alternatives has the merit of respecting the institutional balance between
the organs of the WTO, inasmuch as the AB as adjudicator should not be
in a position of usurping legislative authority. The disadvantage of this
approach, of course, is that until such a time as the WTO Members take
corrective action with respect to the incoherent text, the AB would not be
in a position to admit the legality of any safeguard measures. Clearly, the
Members intended to permit the use of safeguards in some conditions;
without them, the Members might well resort to the use of other instru-
ments of contingent protection in situations that do not fit the ‘‘distor-
tions’’ that the founding fathers meant to address with the SGA.
To avoid such an outcome, we believe that some judicial activism is
warranted in the current jurisprudential environment. Our preferred
interpretation of the treaty text is the ‘‘import supply curve’’ approach.
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With this approach, the potential cause of injury to a domestic industry is
not the increase in the quantity of imports per se (which would be
impossible), but rather a shift in the import supply curve that both causes
imports to surge and the domestic import-competing industry to suffer.
By adopting such an interpretation, the AB undeniably would be adding
words to the SGA that do not exist in the text. However, by doing so, the
AB would be making sense of a conditions test that is poorly described in
the SGA but not wholly absent from the SGA. It is clear that the treaty
negotiators intended to permit application of safeguards in some but not
all circumstances; and the circumstances had to do with the proximate
cause of the deterioration of industry conditions. The import supply
curve approach is faithful to these intentions.
We emphasize that we do not recommend judicial activism lightly. The
Line Pipe dispute and other recent disputes arising from the SGA have two
distinctive features. First, the text does indicate that the authors of the
agreement intended some limits on the application of safeguard measures
and some test for causality. Our interpretation certainly is not contra-
dicted by the text of the agreement. Second, in the absence of some sort of
judicial activism, the balance of rights and obligations that was intended
by the signatories will be severely undermined. Our preferred approach
allows the agreement to be operational, and provides for legal application
of safeguard measures, during the period before the text of the SGA is
improved.
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